Indo-US Nuclear Deal (Part-1)

There is much furore and fan fare among the great Indian middle and above classes (who are not affected by rising inflation & food shortage) and at the government level on the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. It led to many repercussions like the left withdrawing their support to UPA, a photo finish win at the trust votes and easy job for media houses and readers as the central government machinery had to focus only on this issue. As a concerned citizen always interested in India’s strategic movements and an avid observer of the nuclear agreement itself, I have come across a lot of information (and also misinformation) on various aspects related to the agreement, its clauses, IAEA, NSG, 123 agreement, Hyde act, David Mulford, Ronan Sen and his chickens inside and outside the parliament, IPI pipeline and so and so and their implications upon our nation. Needless to say, the bulk of the media are propagating half-truths, partially baked stories and see only one side of the coin. Last week, when I met with my friend Ajay, we had a chit-chat on the issue and his extensive research in the topic clarified many of my doubts and shattered certain misconceptions. Here I would like to explain some of the topics like IAEA, nuclear energy, the 123 agreement, the Hyde act and the likes which are having major bearings on the deal. This is not intended as a debate on whether the deal is required or not, but an explanation of certain technical jargon that may come up in various discussions (so that we know what we are going to speak about before we open our mouths).

Part-1: IAEA & Safeguards Agreement

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. Though established independently of the United Nations under its own international treaty (the IAEA Statute), the IAEA reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. It was established as an autonomous organization on July 29, 1957. The current head of the organization is the Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei. As of now, there are 144 member states in IAEA. The Board of Governors is one of two policy making bodies of the IAEA. The Board consists of 13 members designated by the outgoing Board and 22 members elected by the General Conference (conference of all member nations).

What concern us about IAEA, is its safeguards. Before we understand what the safeguards are, let us understand the definition of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). NWSs are those nations which conducted their first nuclear test and amassed the weapons technology before 1968, and they are the US, UK, China, France and Russia (or USSR). They are the only nations publicly acknowledged by the world to have nuclear weaponry. NNWS have conducted their tests after this year. Since India conducted her first test in 1974, India is not NWS or she is theoretically NNWS. Now coming to the safeguards agreement; there are three kinds of safeguards, which are;

a. Voluntary safeguards applied to nuclear facilities of NWSs under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For your information, India is not a signatory to NPT citing arguments that it does not provide for arms reduction by NWS and does not curb further tests by them but severely restricts NNWSs.

b. Comprehensive or full scope safeguards system (embodied in the IAEA document INFCIRC/153) for NNWSs under the NPT.

c. Facility/Material/Equipment specific safeguards system (as set out in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, Sept.1968) for the facilities of non-NPT signatories brought under safeguards either unilaterally or under some bilateral or multilateral agreement.

The implications of these three types of safeguards are respectively as follows;

a) NWSs can classify their reactors as civilian or military and put the civilian reactors under the safeguards as and when they want.

b) All facilities of NNWSs will be under safeguards for perpetuity. Besides these the technology used in these facilities also should be transferred to IAEA for their thorough inspection and study of safety. Everything happening here is accountable to the IAEA.

c) This agreement concerns non signatories of the NPT and any agreement, bilateral or multilateral signed between the states will contain the list of facilities that can be placed under safeguards. These facilities and their technology will be transferred to the IAEA inspectors and the reactors will remain in perpetuity under the safeguards.

The safeguards agreement that will concern India is the third one as we are not a signatory to the NPT. We have three of our reactors under this sort of safeguards- the twin Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) according to a bilateral agreement with Russia, Tarapur reactors and the upcoming Kudankulam reactors (again as part of an Indo-Russia agreement).

As part of the Indo-US agreement, both parties are speaking of an India specific safeguards agreement which will be based on the INFCIRC/66 template. The major deviation from the INFCIRC/66 is that this India specific agreement seeks to bring not just one but a set of facilities unilaterally identified by India as civilian, under the safeguards. Further facilities could be annexed to the safeguarded set later.

OK, so much for the safeguards. Now questions time.

1. Why should India add her facilities to the IAEA safeguards when we have many facilities successfully running without being under the safeguards?

The Indo-US agreement is civilian in nature. The fuel/technology/equipment supplied as part of the agreement could only be used for civilian purposes. It should never be used for military (weapons) purpose. To ensure this the facility should be under the safeguards agreement, which will make it in turn answerable to IAEA’s inspection which will/may thwart any attempt to divert the fuel/technology/equipment for non-peaceful purposes.

2. We have nuclear weapons, but why are we still not a NWS?

Theoretically the answer should be; according to the definition NWSs are those that conducted their nuclear tests and amassed nuclear arsenal before 1968. But the actual reason can be- NWS status confers high powers and rights upon us which the other nation(s) might not want us to have. They may even lose the leverage they have on us. Besides it may set a bad precedent as other NNWSs with nuclear weaponry may also demand NWS status.

3. Once a facility of NWS is added to IAEA safeguards, is there any way to pull it out of safeguards?

As of now, after referring all the IAEA, documents, the answer is NO. Oops, there is one. IAEA and host country can jointly determine that the nuclear/non-nuclear material, equipment or component in question has been consumed, is not longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practically irrecoverable. In short, that means, the IAEA safeguards wear off once the facility has been decommissioned.

Since there are no further questions that I can conceive of right now, I have decided to move on to the next part. Part-II will deal with India and her rising energy needs.

References:

1. IAEA on Wikipedia

2. Frontline; July 19- August 1, 2008, Volume-25, Number 15