Part-1: IAEA & Safeguards Agreement
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. Though established independently of the United Nations under its own international treaty (the IAEA Statute), the IAEA reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA has its headquarters in
What concern us about IAEA, is its safeguards. Before we understand what the safeguards are, let us understand the definition of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). NWSs are those nations which conducted their first nuclear test and amassed the weapons technology before 1968, and they are the
a. Voluntary safeguards applied to nuclear facilities of NWSs under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For your information,
b. Comprehensive or full scope safeguards system (embodied in the IAEA document INFCIRC/153) for NNWSs under the NPT.
c. Facility/Material/Equipment specific safeguards system (as set out in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, Sept.1968) for the facilities of non-NPT signatories brought under safeguards either unilaterally or under some bilateral or multilateral agreement.
The implications of these three types of safeguards are respectively as follows;
a) NWSs can classify their reactors as civilian or military and put the civilian reactors under the safeguards as and when they want.
b) All facilities of NNWSs will be under safeguards for perpetuity. Besides these the technology used in these facilities also should be transferred to IAEA for their thorough inspection and study of safety. Everything happening here is accountable to the IAEA.
c) This agreement concerns non signatories of the NPT and any agreement, bilateral or multilateral signed between the states will contain the list of facilities that can be placed under safeguards. These facilities and their technology will be transferred to the IAEA inspectors and the reactors will remain in perpetuity under the safeguards.
The safeguards agreement that will concern
As part of the Indo-US agreement, both parties are speaking of an
OK, so much for the safeguards. Now questions time.
1. Why should
The Indo-US agreement is civilian in nature. The fuel/technology/equipment supplied as part of the agreement could only be used for civilian purposes. It should never be used for military (weapons) purpose. To ensure this the facility should be under the safeguards agreement, which will make it in turn answerable to IAEA’s inspection which will/may thwart any attempt to divert the fuel/technology/equipment for non-peaceful purposes.
2. We have nuclear weapons, but why are we still not a NWS?
Theoretically the answer should be; according to the definition NWSs are those that conducted their nuclear tests and amassed nuclear arsenal before 1968. But the actual reason can be- NWS status confers high powers and rights upon us which the other nation(s) might not want us to have. They may even lose the leverage they have on us. Besides it may set a bad precedent as other NNWSs with nuclear weaponry may also demand NWS status.
3. Once a facility of NWS is added to IAEA safeguards, is there any way to pull it out of safeguards?
As of now, after referring all the IAEA, documents, the answer is NO. Oops, there is one. IAEA and host country can jointly determine that the nuclear/non-nuclear material, equipment or component in question has been consumed, is not longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practically irrecoverable. In short, that means, the IAEA safeguards wear off once the facility has been decommissioned.
Since there are no further questions that I can conceive of right now, I have decided to move on to the next part. Part-II will deal with
References:
2. Frontline; July 19- August 1, 2008, Volume-25, Number 15